[clue-talk] national ID card

[Jed S. Baer]

On Sat, 30 Jun 2007 14:15:57 -0500 (CDT)
erik at ezolan.com wrote:

> The argument I'm seeing on the "No national ID" side looks a lot like
> "Security through obscurity", which I also disagree with.

Not the same thing. Security by obscurity is dealing more in the realm of
secret algorithms, which can sometimes be broken by reverse engineering,
for example, or by de-compiling. Or by brute-force attacks, perhaps. Not a
complete example, I realize. There are other cases, such as putting your
ssh daemon on a different port, which, while not completely effective, can
still yield positive results.

Think more in terms of "trade secret" and you're closer to the mark.

All security and privacy issues are trade-offs. The obvious example is
consumer rebates. You give them marketing data in exchange for your 10
bucks, or whatever amount.

Just because security by obscurity isn't perfect, doesn't mean it has no
use, or positive benefit. A person's credit and medical history aren't the
same thing as a block-cipher algorithm.

The easiest way to keep data secure is to not reveal it at all. That's
mostly impossible, but doable in some circumstances.

> Yes, by keeping a bunch of separate databases, it makes it more
> difficult for the government to do anything.

A definite positive, most of the time.

> Like correct inevitable mistakes, errors, or sabotage.
> 
> By keeping a unified database it forces the government to regulate and
> take good care of it.

Please forgive me for being blunt, but ..

BWwwwwaaaaaaaahaahahahahahahhaha.

How many examples have we already seen in the past few years of the gov
losing sensitive data? Hmm, Los Alamos and the Veterans Administration
come to mind right off. Ask any veterans who have dealt with the VA and/or
OCHAMPUS (and its successor) about how maddeningly difficult it can
sometimes be to get things done. Sure, private industry can be as bad, but
speaking as someone who has been on the inside, doing contract for a
variety of government projects, few things are more scary than trusting
the feddies to properly manage ALL my private data.

Consider just the case of the debacle known as the "No Fly List". How long
did it take for DHS to get a procedure in place for getting your name
removed? (Or has that happened? ISTR reading about that last year.)

> Right now we have databases operating in the grey
> area because we're not supposed to be having them, in principle.

Not supposed to? By what measure? It is a business necessity for CitiBank,
et. al. to keep at least some degree of records regarding your purchases,
so they know how much to bill you. This is inherent in an individual's
decision to have a charge plate. (Oh, how I love dredging up those archaic
terms -- though I suppose I'm showing my age by doing so. ;-) )

The question of whether the original company has the right to sell such
data is a different matter. It goes to the question of who owns data about
yourself. It's easily arguable that CitiBank has an ownership interest in
data produced by transactions processed by them. IMHO, it's also easily
arguable that I do to. This is the grey area. Whose permission is required
before revelation?

> This is actually *worse* than a national database.

Depends upon how you slice it. Right now, a breach results in exposure of
only certain data. A breach of an all-encompasing database would reveal
much more.

Before I wind up recapitulating everything Sean said, I'll just toss out a
quote from LBJ: "You do not examine legislation in the light of the
benefits it will convey if properly administered, but in the light of the
wrongs it would do and the harms it would cause if improperly
administered." (Would that he had taken his own advice.)

jed