[CLUE-Tech] OpenSSH Security Advisory (adv.channelalloc) (fwd)

[Randy Arabie]

Just in from the folks at OpenSSH.

-- 
Cheers!

Randy

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Randy Arabie
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2002 12:56:33 +0100
From: Markus Friedl <markus at openbsd.org>
To: announce at openbsd.org, security-announce at openbsd.org,
     openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org, openssh-unix-announce at mindrot.org
Cc: BUGTRAQ at SECURITYFOCUS.COM, misc at openbsd.org, lwn at lwn.net
Subject: OpenSSH Security Advisory (adv.channelalloc)


1. Systems affected:

	All versions of OpenSSH between 2.0 and 3.0.2 contain
	an off-by-one error in the channel code.

	OpenSSH 3.1 and later are not affected.

2. Impact:

        This bug can be exploited locally by an authenticated user
        logging into a vulnerable OpenSSH server or by a malicious
        SSH server attacking a vulnerable OpenSSH client.
	
3. Solution:

	Upgrade to OpenSSH 3.1 or apply the following patch.

4. Credits:

	This bug was discovered by Joost Pol <joost at pine.nl>


Appendix:

Index: channels.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.bin/ssh/channels.c,v
retrieving revision 1.170
retrieving revision 1.171
diff -u -r1.170 -r1.171
--- channels.c	27 Feb 2002 21:23:13 -0000	1.170
+++ channels.c	4 Mar 2002 19:37:58 -0000	1.171
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 {
 	Channel *c;
 
-	if (id < 0 || id > channels_alloc) {
+	if (id < 0 || id >= channels_alloc) {
 		log("channel_lookup: %d: bad id", id);
 		return NULL;
 	}