[CLUE-Talk] More Evidence for a Hussein - AlQaeda Link

[Randy Arabie]

Quoting "Timothy C. Klein" <teece at silverklein.net>:

> * Randy Arabie (randy at arabie.org) wrote:
> > Quoting "Timothy C. Klein" <teece at silverklein.net>:
> > 
> > > * Jed S. Baer (thag at frii.com) wrote:
> > > > Well, here's an interesting article:
> > > > http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/42706.htm
> > > > 
> > > > <quote>
> > > > Their deadly collaboration - which may have included the bombing of
> the
> > > > USS Cole and the 9/11 attacks - is revealed in a 16-page memo to the
> > > > Senate Intelligence Committee that cites reports from a variety of
> > > > domestic and foreign spy agencies compiled by multiple sources, The
> Weekly
> > > > Standard reports.
> > > 
> > > Here is another one that is a must read, especially if you felt
> > > compelled by the leaked Feith memo.
> > > 
> > > http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0311.ackerman.html
> > > 
> > 
> > Or this one, especially if you felt compelled by the Washington Monthly:
> > 
> >
> http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/378fmxyz.asp
> > 
> > <quote>
> > An analysis that follows No. 18 provides additional context and an
> explanation 
> > of these reports: 
> > 
> > Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different sources,
> 
> > corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings between al
> Qaeda 
> > operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. None of the
> 
> > reports have information on operational details or the purpose of such 
> > meetings. The covert nature of the relationship would indicate strict 
> > compartmentation [sic] of operations.
> > Information about connections between al Qaeda and Iraq was so widespread
> by 
> > early 1999 that it made its way into the mainstream press. A January 11,
> 1999, 
> > Newsweek story ran under this headline: "Saddam + Bin Laden?" The story
> cited 
> > an "Arab intelligence source" with knowledge of contacts between Iraq and
> al 
> > Qaeda. "According to this source, Saddam expected last month's American and
> 
> > British bombing campaign to go on much longer than it did. The dictator 
> > believed that as the attacks continued, indignation would grow in the
> Muslim 
> > world, making his terrorism offensive both harder to trace and more
> effective. 
> > With acts of terror contributing to chaos in the region, Turkey, Jordan,
> Saudi 
> > Arabia, and Kuwait might feel less inclined to support Washington. Saddam's
> 
> > long-term strategy, according to several sources, is to bully or cajole
> Muslim 
> > countries into breaking the embargo against Iraq, without waiting for the 
> > United Nations to lift if formally." 
> > </quote>
> > 
> > That sounds like some compelling analysis (ie. not simply unrelated "raw" 
> > intelligence) to me.
> 
> The key sentence above is "None of the reports have information on
> operational details or purpose of such meetings."
> 
> The US had extensive 'contacts' with Soviet intelligence officials
> during the Cold War. Were we obvisously in cahoots? Bin Laden had
> publicly stated he hated Hussein; it is also entirely possible that
> Hussein was trying to get people to defect from bin Laden's organization
> so that he would have intelligence about their operation. We don't have
> any idea. But there is zero evidence of any of these 'contacts' having
> gone anywhere. And we now occupy the Iraqi Information Ministry. This
> hearsay nonsese is the best we can do?

Aside from satellite pictures, surveillence photos, and wiretaps, "raw" 
intellegence IS "hearsay nonsense".  The ONLY way to obtain "operational 
details or the purpose of such meetings" would be what you call "hearsay 
nonsense".  Satellite pictures, surveillence photos, and wiretaps do not 
provide "operational details or the purpose of" face-to-face meetings between 
terrorists and their collaborators.

Thus, by your standards, the US Intelligence community is in a Catch 22.

Anyway, regarding your question, "Is this the best we can do?"  I guess you 
didn't read the link...did you?  

<quote>
One of the most interesting things to note about the 16-page memo is that it 
covers only a fraction of the evidence that will eventually be available to 
document the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. For one thing, both Saddam 
and bin Laden were desperate to keep their cooperation secret. (Remember, Iraqi 
intelligence used liquid paper on an internal intelligence document to conceal 
bin Laden's name.) For another, few people in the U.S. government are expressly 
looking for such links. There is no Iraq-al Qaeda equivalent of the CIA's 1,400-
person Iraq Survey Group currently searching Iraq for weapons of mass 
destruction. 

Instead, CIA and FBI officials are methodically reviewing Iraqi intelligence 
files that survived the three-week war last spring. These documents would cover 
several miles if laid end-to-end. And they are in Arabic. They include not only 
connections between bin Laden and Saddam, but also revolting details of the 
regime's long history of brutality. It will be a slow process. 

So Feith's memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee is best viewed as sort of 
a "Cliff's Notes" version of the relationship. It contains the highlights, but 
it is far from exhaustive. 
</quote>

But, I guess it really doesn't matter what they uncover, since it appears the 
only thing that would convice folks like you would be a photograph or video 
footage of Saddam and Bin Laden comparing notes over a scale model of a US 
Government facility.  Even then, I suspect the naysayers would suggest that 
they just happened to be enrolled in the same architecture class at the 
university.
 
> More importantly, the majority of the meetings were in the mid 90's, and
> by 2000 had completely stopped.

No.  Granted, there is contradictory evidence regarding the nature of thier 
post-1999 relationship, but that's quite a bit different that "completely 
stopped."  Had you read the link, you may have seen this:

<quote>
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS about the nature of the relationship between Iraq and al 
Qaeda from mid-1999 through 2003 are conflicting. One senior Iraqi intelligence 
officer in U.S. custody, Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah, "said that the last contact 
between the IIS and al Qaeda was in July 1999. Bin Laden wanted to meet with 
Saddam, he said. The guidance sent back from Saddam's office reportedly ordered 
Iraqi intelligence to refrain from any further contact with bin Laden and al 
Qaeda. The source opined that Saddam wanted to distance himself from al Qaeda." 

The bulk of reporting on the relationship contradicts this claim. One report 
states that "in late 1999" al Qaeda set up a training camp in northern Iraq 
that "was operational as of 1999." Other reports suggest that the Iraqi regime 
contemplated several offers of safe haven to bin Laden throughout 1999. 
</quote>

But, even if the relationship between bin Laden and Saddam had ended...who 
cares?  The bottom line is Saddam's regime did support *terrorists*.  

Give me one good reason to believe they wouldn't continue to do so.
-- 
Allons Rouler!

Randy
http://www.arabie.org/